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Schatz: Deliberate Indifference: Is There More to Cruel and Unusual Punis

DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE: IS THERE MORE TO CRUEL

AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT THAN THE WANTON
INFLICTION OF UNNECESSARY PAIN?

Jones v. State, 701 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1997)
Erin R. Schatz*

Petitioner was an inmate in a Florida prison awaiting his execution.'
Seeking a determination that Florida's electric chair was a cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment 2 to the United
States Constitution,3 he petitioned to invoke the Supreme Court of
Florida's all writs jurisdiction.4 As proof of his contention, Petitioner
referred to the most recent malfunction' in Florida's electric chair.6 After
conducting two evidentiary hearings,7 the trial court reasoned that Florida's
electric chair did not wantonly inflict unnecessary pain, and was therefore
not cruel and unusual In an appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida,
Petitioner contended9 that the trial judge should not have limited the inquiry
* To my family, whose love, guidance, and support I will always cherish.
1. Jones v. State, 701 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1997).
2. Additionally, Petitioner contended that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights
were violated. See id. at 76.
3. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
4. See Jones v. Butterworth, 691 So. 2d 481 (1997).
5. See Jones, 701 So. 2d at 76. During the execution ofPedro Medina on March 25, 1997,
smoke and flames came out from under the headpiece. See id. at 86 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
6. See id.
7. First, the Supreme Court of Florida relinquished jurisdiction to the trial court for a
hearing on the claim that Florida's electric chair was cruel or unusual punishment. See
Butterworth, 691 So. 2d at 482. The trial court was to review testimony of engineering experts,
medical experts and other witnesses in order to make a decision. See id. Then, after the inmate's
petition was denied, he appealed and the Supreme Court ofFlorida again relinquished jurisdiction
to the trial court to provide petitioner with an opportunity to inspect electrocution equipment, as
well as gain access to other evidentiary items and witnesses. See Jones v. Butterworth, 695 So.
2d 679, 681 (Fla. 1997).
8. See Jones, 701 So. 2d at 77. The trial judge made five significant conclusions of law
upon which the Supreme Court of Florida based its decision. See id. First, cruel or unusual
punishment was defined as the wanton infliction of unnecessary pain. See id. Second, Florida's
electric chair, in past executions, did not to wantonly inflict unnecessary pain, and was therefore
constitutional. See id.Third, Florida's future executions also will not be cruel and unusual. See
id. at 78. Fourth, Florida's electric chair at the time of the action was not cruel or unusual. See id.
Finally, the court noted that it was up to the legislature, not the judiciary, to adopt lethal injections
and abandon the electric chair. See id.
9. There were actually six additional points on appeal. First, Petitioner appealed the trial
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to proof that an electrocuted person experienced pain and should have
considered the prison officials' deliberate indifference to the prisoner's well
being.'" The Supreme Court of Florida denied Petitioner's claim and
HELD, that Florida's electric chair does not involve torture, a lingering
death, or the infliction of unnecessary and wanton pain and is therefore
constitutional."
Historically, when the United States Supreme Court has examined
Eighth Amendment claims, the Court has focused on both the effect of the
punishment in question as well as the actions of prison officials. 2 When
scrutinizing the punishment's effect, the Court sometimes focuses on a
prisoner's pain, suffering, and the degree of torture involved in the
punishment. 3 In other instances, the Court also includes a measurement of
the punishment against society's evolving standards of decency. 4 Although
the Court varies its focus when examining a punishment's effect,' 5 the
Court has been more consistent when examining the behavior of prison
officials. 6 Specifically, the Court considers whether a prisoner's claim is
based upon an accidental harm to the prisoner as opposed to an intentional
injury inflicted by state officials. 7
The Court first examined whether an accidental harm constituted a cruel
and unusual punishment in Francisv. Resweber.'8 In Francis,a prisoner
was placed in the electric chair for execution but, as a result of a mechanical
malfunction, did not die. 9 A new death warrant was then issued for a
subsequent execution to take place at a later date.2" The prisoner petitioned
court's ruling on his objection to a witness' testimony. See id. Second, he appealed the denial of
his objection to expert testimony. See id. Next, he appealed the judge's refusal to consider
evidence that Florida's executions are unusual since many states do not use the electric chair
anymore. See id. at 79. Petitioner also contended that his attorney-client privilege was violated.
See id. He further attacked numerous evidentiary rulings. See id.at 80. In addition, he contended
that he did not receive a fair hearing because the trial judge was biased. See id.
10. Seeid. at79.
11. See id.
12. Compare Hudson v. McMillan 503 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (citations omitted) (holding that
punishments violate the Eighth Amendment if they are "incompatible with the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" or if they involve the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain) with Jones, 701 So. 2d at 79 (holding that the proper Eighth
Amendment test is one which involves torture or a lingering death or the wanton infliction of
unnecessary pain).
13. See Jones, 701 So. 2dat 79.
14. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
15. See supra text accompanying note 12.
16. CompareEstelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (applying the deliberate indifference standard) with
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834-38 (1994) (applying the deliberate indifference standard).
17. See, e.g., Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463-64 (1946).
18. See id. at 462, 464.
19. Seeid. at460.
20. See id. at 461. The second attempt at executing the prisoner was to take place six days
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the Court, contending2 ' that a second punishment would constitute a
lingering death since he already experienced psychological strain during the
first failed execution.22 The issue before the Court was whether a second
execution constituted a violation of the Eighth Amendment.2
In denying the petitioner's claim,24 the Court examined the effect of the
punishment25 on the prisoner as well as the actions and intentions of the
prison officials who inflicted the punishment.26 When examining the effect
of the punishment, the Court declared as unconstitutional those
punishments which wantonly inflict pain upon a prisoner.27 When examining
the prison officials' actions, the Court reasoned that an unforeseeable
accident did not render a punishment unconstitutional if the punishment
alone was not cruel and unusual.28 Therefore, since the Court deemed the
first failed execution to be an unforeseeable accident, the Court held that
the second execution would not constitute a cruel and unusual
punishment.29
Based on Francis, the Court in Estelle v. Gamble30 formulated a
standard that examined the prison officials' intention in relation to the harm
suffered by the prisoner.3 ' In Estelle, the respondent was an inmate who
injured his back 32 while performing prison work.33 Alleging that he received
inadequate medical treatment and, as a result, continued to suffer pain, the

later. See id.
21. The petitioner also contended that a second execution would violate the United States
Constitution's Due Process Clause and the double jeopardy provision. See id. The Court held that
there was no due process violation since the Court could not protect everyone from accidents nor
prevent accidents from occurring. See id. at 465.
22. See id. at 464.
23. See id. at 463.
24. The court actually denied all ofthe petitioners claims: the EighthAmendment claim, the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim, and the double jeopardy claim. See id. at 462-63,465.
25. "Effect of the punishment" terminology is used to separate the standards that courts use
to judge Eighth Amendment cases into two categories: (1) the effect of the punishment; and (2)
the actions or omissions of the prison officials. "Effects" include the wanton infliction of pain,
torture, or a lingering death, for example.
26. See id. at 462, 463-64.
27. See id. at 463-64.
28. See id. at 464.
29. See id.
30. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
31. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97, 102-03, 105-06.
32. Specifically, an item fell onto his back while he was unloading a truck. See id. at 99. He
was treated by doctors for several months. See id. at 99-101. He was brought to the prison
disciplinary committee for refusing to work. See id. at 101. Although he told the committee that
he could not work because he was still in pain, the committee placed him in solitary confinement
and he alleged that his medical needs were not tended to sufficiently. See id. at 99-101.
33. See id.
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respondent claimed that his punishment was cruel and unusual."' The Court
stated that the punishment would be cruel and unusual if the prison
officials' actions or omissions were sufficient to indicate a deliberate
indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs.35
In evaluating the prisoner's claim, theEstelle Court built upon the same
two considerations addressed by the FrancisCourt.36 First, in addition to
those punishments which involved the infliction of unnecessary pain, the
Estelle Court declared that punishments incompatible with society's
evolving standards of decency are also unconstitutional.3 " Expanding the
Francis Court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment beyond those
punishments which wantonly inflict pain, the Estelle Court therefore
deemed unconstitutional any punishment that would be repugnant to
mankind.38 Second, when examining the intention of prison officials, the
Estelle Court looked to Francisfor the proposition that an inadvertent
failure to provide adequate medical care was not cruel and unusual.3 9
Specifically, a prisoner would have to allege deliberate indifference to
serious needs in order to have a valid Eighth Amendment claim.4"
After the Court articulated this deliberate indifference standard in
Estelle, the Court then interpreted its application in Farmerv. Brennan.4
In Farmer, the petitioner was a preoperative transsexual who was
incarcerated with other males even though he displayed overtly feminine
characteristics. 42 After being beaten and raped, the petitioner filed a
complaint alleging that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the
risk that a transsexual inmate would be vulnerable to sexual attacks if
incarcerated with other males.4"
At issue in Farmerwas whether prison officials acted with deliberate
indifference and thus violated the Eighth Amendment." The petitioner
argued that deliberate indifference exists even in situations where prison
34. See id. at 101.
35. See id. at 106.
36. See id. at 102-03, 105.
37. See id. at 102-03.
38. See id. at 105-06.
39. See id. TheEstelle court paralleled its facts to the facts ofFrancisand reasoned thatjust
as an "innocent misadventure" in Francisdid not render the second execution cruel and unusual,
neither would the situation before the Estelle Court be cruel and unusual.
40. See id.at 104-05. The Court noted that if prisoners were intentionally denied treatment,
the punishment would be cruel and unusual. See id. The prisoner simply failed to show that the

prison official acted with deliberate indifference to his needs. See id.
41. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
42. See id. at 829. Although he was preoperative, the prisoner underwent estrogen therapy

and had an unsuccessful surgery to remove his testicles. See id.He wore women's clothing, and
wore them in a feminine manner. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 832.
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officials are unaware of a substantial risk of harm provided they should
46
have been aware of it."5 Disagreeing with the petitioner's interpretation,
the Court asserted that deliberate indifference exists only ifthe official acted
or failed to act while having knowledge47 of a substantial risk of harm to the
prisoner.4" The Court therefore emphasized the necessity of a prison
official's culpable state of mind. 49 The Court also reasoned that the alleged
deprivation must be sufficiently serious such that it might lead to the denial
of "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities."5 " Reasoning that
prison officials were unaware of the risk ofharm to transsexual inmates, the
Court denied the petitioner's claim.5 '
Similarly, Petitioner in the instant case brought a claim based on the
deliberate indifference of prison officials.5 2 In examining the effect of the
punishment on the prisoner, the instant court defined a cruel and unusual
punishment as one which involves torture, a lingering death, or the infliction
of unnecessary and wanton pain. 3 Because there was no evidence of pain
in Florida's executions, the court held that the punishment was not cruel
and unusual.54 In examining the prison officials' actions or omissions, the
instant court interpreted deliberate indifference as requiring the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain. 5 Since evidence existed that Florida's
executions did not result in pain to the victims, the court found no merit to
Petitioner's claim that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference."
Relying on the trial court's findings of facts, the instant court
additionally noted that prior to the malfunction noted in Petitioner's claim,
45. See id. at 836-37. The petitioner urged the Court to adopt a civil law standard of

recklessness. See id.
46. See id. at 837. The petitioner urged the Court to adopt an objective test of deliberate

indifference whereby recklessness on the part of prison officials would satisfy deliberate
indifference. See id. at 836-37, The Court, however, applied a subjective test. See id. at 837.
47. See id. Although the prisoner wanted recklessness to satisfy the standard, the Court
stated that "a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an
inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive
risk to inmate health or safety." Id.

48. See id. The respondent asked the court to apply a criminal law approach to recklessness.
See id.Additionally, the Court stated that the requirement ofa culpable state ofmind follows from
the principle that only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Eighth
Amendment. See id. at 834. However, the Court stated that there are two requirements of
deliberate indifference: (1) the alleged deprivation must be serious and (2) the prison officials
must have a culpable state of mind. The court did not state that pain is a requirement. See id.
49. See id.
50. Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).

51. See id.
at 850.
52. See Jones v. State, 701 So. 2d 76, 79 (Fla. 1997).

53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id. at n.2.

56. See id. at 79.
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there had been no other malfunctions in the last seventeen executions. 57
Justice Shaw, in a strong dissent, instead took into account the last eighteen
executions, as opposed to the last seventeen, and noted that there were two
complications." Justice Shaw argued that this record, therefore, compelled
finding that Florida's electric chair is unconstitutional.59 Justice Shaw
further reasoned that the harm to the prisoners was in the form of excessive
mutilation and brutalization.6' Specifically, Justice Shaw relied on prior
findings of fact to describe that smoke and flames emanated from the
victims' heads and that the victims received first, second and third degree
bums.6 Asserting that Florida's executions have an eleven percent failure
rate, Justice Shaw concluded that there is a limit to the "constitutional
tolerance for error." 62
The trend from Francisto Farmersuggests that when courts examine
the behavior of prison officials, they adhere to the deliberate indifference
standard.63 On the other hand, when courts examine the effect of a
punishment on the prisoner, they vary in their approach." Some courts
focus on the degree of unnecessary pain,65 while others include a
measurement of the punishment against society's evolving standards of

57.
58.
59.
60.

See id. at 77.
See id. at 87 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
See id. (Shaw, J.,
dissenting).
See id. (Shaw, J.dissenting). Justice Shaw, describing the malfunctions, stated:
In two out of eighteen executions ... the condemned prisoner was engulfed in
smoke, flames, and the odor of burning material-which some observers
described as the stench of burning or roasting flesh-when the switch was
pulled. The head of one prisoner (Tafero) was burned and charred, his face was
seared by flames, and his eyebrows, eyelashes, and facial hair were burned. The
head of another (Medina) was burned and charred and his face was scalded.

Id. (Shaw, 3., dissenting).
61. See id. (Shaw, J.,
dissenting).
62. Id. (Shaw, J.,
dissenting).
63. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (holding that deliberate
indifference of prison personnel to a risk of serious harm is a violation ofthe Eighth Amendment);
see also Farmer,511 U.S. at 828 (holding that a prison official's deliberate indifference to a
serious risk of harm to a prisoner violates the Eighth Amendment).
64. CompareFrancis,329 U.S. at 463 (reasoning that the infliction ofunnecessary pain in
the executions ofprisoners is cruel and unusual) with Estelle,429 U.S. at 102, 103 (reasoning that
punishments incompatible with evolving standards of decency or those which involve the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain are unconstitutional) and Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 10 (1991) (reasoning that punishments incompatible with evolving standards of decency
as well as those involving the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain are unconstitutional) and
Jones, 701 So. 2d at 79 (defining a cruel and unusual punishment as one which involves torture,
a lingering death, or the wanton infliction of unnecessary pain).
65. See Jones, 701 So. 2d at 79.
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decency.66 The instant court's analysis ofPetitioner's claim halted as soon
as the court noted that the recent malfunction caused no pain to the
victim.67 However, the instant court misinterpreted Farmer'srequirements
of deliberate indifference and therefore did not apply the correct test of
deliberate indifference. 68
Farmerlists two requirements for the test of deliberate indifference.69
The first requirement is that the prison officials' alleged deprivations must
be serious.7" Sufficiently serious deprivations are those that deny "minimal
civilized measures of life's necessities."7 The second requirement is that
prison officials must have a culpable state of mind.72 Nowhere in the
opinion does the FarmerCourt articulate the requirement of the wanton
infliction of unnecessary pain.73
The instant court utilized a narrow definition of deliberate indifference,
one which considered only the level of pain and torture in the punishment.74
In doing so, the instant court made it impossible to apply the Farmertest
of deliberate indifference since it had already declared that the malfunctions
caused no pain to the victims.75 The correct application of this standard is
vital since a finding of deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials,
by definition, renders a punishment cruel and unusual in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.76
Even if the instant court had correctly interpreted the deliberate
indifference standard, it probably still would have come to the same
conclusion since the court based its opinion on an incomplete set offacts.7 7
66. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10; see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102-03.
67. See Jones, 701 So. 2d at 79. The court stated that, "[tihere was substantial evidence.

that executions in Florida are conducted without any pain whatsoever, and this record is entirely
devoid of evidence suggesting deliberate indifference to a prisoner's well-being on the part of state
officials." Id.
68. CompareFanmer,511 U.S. at 834 (holding thatthe two requirements forprison officials

to be liable for deliberate indifference are: (1) a sufficiently serious deprivation and (2) a culpable
state of mind) with Jones, 701 So. 2d at n.2 (stating that the Farmer test for deliberate
indifference requires the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain for an Eighth Amendment

violation).
69. SeeFarmer,511 U.S. at 834.

70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id. The Court simply refers to the requirement ofunnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain, but never states it as a requirement for deliberate indifference. See id.
73. See id.
74. See Jones, 701 So. 2d at 79.

75. See id.at n.2. "TheFarmeropinion also points out that only the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment." Id.
76. See Estelle,429 U.S. at 106. The Court stated that deliberate indifference on the part
of prison officials results in a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. See id.
77. A more thorough opinion would have acknowledged that there was another malfunction
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As Justice Shaw noted in his dissent, there had been two malfunctions in
the past eighteen executions.78 The majority, however, based its opinion on
a record which revealed only one malfunction in the past seventeen
executions." Applying the deliberate indifference standard to facts revealing
only one malfunction, the instant court could have logically concluded that
there was no deliberate indifference to a risk of serious harm to the
prisoner.)8 Looking to Francisand Estelle, the instant court would have
probably reasoned that one malfunction out of seventeen was an
unforeseeable accident.8" As the Court reasoned in FrancisandEstelle, one
unforeseeable inadvertent occurrence is not substantial enough to render an
otherwise constitutional punishment unconstitutional.8 2
On the other hand, if the instant court had applied the correct
interpretation of the deliberate indifference standard to the facts noted in
Justice Shaw's dissent, 83 the instant court might have held that the prison
officials violated the Eighth Amendment." Francis,Estelle, and Farmer,
taken together, suggest that once a harm is no longer an accident, and
prison officials therefore act or fail to act with a culpable mind,85 a
punishment is cruel and unusual.86 Applying the correct interpretation ofthe
deliberate indifference standard to the facts noted in the dissent,8 7 the
instant court could have considered the excessive mutilation of prisoners to
be a denial of"the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities," and thus,
a sufficiently serious harm. 8 Further, the instant court could have
in Florida's electric chair just at the point where the trial court cut off the inquiry. Cf Jones, 701
So.2d at 87 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
78. See id. (Shaw, J., dissenting).
79. See id. at 77.
80. See generally Francis,329 U.S. at 464 (reasoning that an unforeseeable accident does
not add an element of cruelty to a punishment).
81. See id; see alsoEstelle,429 U.S. at 105 (suggesting that an accident alone is not enough
to characterize a punishment as the wanton infliction of unnecessary pain).
82. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105; see also Francis, 329 U.S. at 464 (noting that one
unforeseeable accident is not enough to render a punishment cruel and unusual if the punishment
was not otherwise cruel and unusual).

83. Facts that reflected more than one malfunction in Florida's electric chair would have
been more accurate. See Jones, 701 So. 2d at 87 (Shaw, J. dissenting).

84. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, 105. Once prison officials are aware of a harm to a
prisoner, it is no longer an "innocent misadventure" if it happens a second time. See id.
85. This "culpable mind" standard is simply the definition of the deliberate indifference
standard. See, e.g., Farmer,511 U.S. at 837.
86. See id. Once a prison official is aware of a harm to a prisoner and he acts or fails to act
to eliminate that harm, he is acting with deliberate indifference. See id.
87. The dissent noted that two out of eighteen executions failed, and specified that this was

therefore an eleven percent failure rate. See Jones, 701 So. 2d at 87 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 88 (Shaw, J., dissenting). Justice Shaw's analysis suggests that he believes the
record ofmalfunctions is contrary to evolving standards of decency. See id. (Shaw, J., dissenting).
The sufficiently serious harm is one requirement under the Farmerinterpretation of deliberate
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determined that the prison officials had a culpable state of mind. 9 The first
malfunction could have been interpreted by prison officials as an accident. 90
However, once two prisoners were seared and burned, prison officials were
aware of a risk of serious harm to the victims, yet they continued to execute
prisoners in Florida's electric chair.9
By incorrectly interpreting the deliberate indifference standard, the
instant court made it nearly impossible for future petitioners to prove
deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials. Additionally, the
instant court deviated from Supreme Court precedent by factoring pain into
the deliberate indifference standard.
If there truly is a limit on the
"constitutional tolerance for error,"' the instant court should certainly have
given it tremendous weight in an area with such finality and irreversibility
as the executions of prisoners. The instant court's conservative analysis
leaves unanswered the question that asks when these malfunctions are no
longer mere accidents "for which no man is to blame."' Furthermore, the
instant court's misinterpretation of the deliberate indifference standard
closes a door which, if left open, would allow the Supreme Court ofFlorida
to declare Florida's electric chair unconstitutional in the future.

indifference. See Farmer,511 U.S. at 834.
89. The "culpable state of mind" parallels the second requirement under Farmer's

"deliberate indifference" standard. See id.
90. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. An accident is not enough to render an otherwise
constitutional punishment unconstitutional. See id.
91. See id.
92. See Jones, 701 So. 2d at 87 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
93. See Francis,329 U.S. at 462 ("Accidents happen for which no man is to blame.").
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